The Mind and the Machine. On the Conceptual and Moral Implications of Brain-Machine Interaction by Schermer, Maartje
ORIGINAL PAPER
The Mind and the Machine. On the Conceptual and Moral
Implications of Brain-Machine Interaction
Maartje Schermer
Received: 5 November 2009 /Accepted: 5 November 2009 /Published online: 1 December 2009
# The Author(s) 2009. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Brain-machine interfaces are a growing
field of research and application. The increasing
possibilities to connect the human brain to electronic
devices and computer software can be put to use in
medicine, the military, and entertainment. Concrete
technologies include cochlear implants, Deep Brain
Stimulation, neurofeedback and neuroprosthesis. The
expectations for the near and further future are high,
though it is difficult to separate hope from hype. The
focus in this paper is on the effects that these new
technologies may have on our ‘symbolic order’—on
the ways in which popular categories and concepts
may change or be reinterpreted. First, the blurring
distinction between man and machine and the idea of
the cyborg are discussed. It is argued that the morally
relevant difference is that between persons and non-
persons, which does not necessarily coincide with the
distinction between man and machine. The concept of
the person remains useful. It may, however, become
more difficult to assess the limits of the human body.
Next, the distinction between body and mind is
discussed. The mind is increasingly seen as a function
of the brain, and thus understood in bodily and
mechanical terms. This raises questions concerning
concepts of free will and moral responsibility that
may have far reaching consequences in the field of
law, where some have argued for a revision of our
criminal justice system, from retributivist to conse-
quentialist. Even without such a (unlikely and
unwarranted) revision occurring, brain-machine inter-
actions raise many interesting questions regarding
distribution and attribution of responsibility.
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Introduction
Within two or three decades our brains will have been
entirely unravelled and made technically accessible:
nanobots will be able to immerse us totally in virtual
reality and connect our brains directly to the Internet.
Soon after that we will expand our intellect in a
spectacular manner by melting our biological brains
with non-biological intelligence. At least that is the
prophecy of Ray Kurzweil, futurist, transhumanist
and successful inventor of, amongst other things, the
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He is not the only one who foresees great possibilities
and, what’s more, has the borders between biological
and non-biological, real and virtual, and human and
machine, disappear with the greatest of ease. Some of
these possibilities are actually already here. On 22 June
2004, a bundle of minuscule electrodes was implanted
into the brain of the 25-year-old Matthew Nagel (who
was completely paralysed due to a high spinal cord
lesion) to enable him to operate a computer by means
of his thoughts. This successful experiment seems to
be an important step on the way to the blending of
brains and computers or humans and machines, that
Kurzweil and others foresee. With regard to the actual
developments in neuroscience and the convergence
of neurotechnology with information, communication-
and nanotechnology in particular it is still unclear how
realistic the promises are. The same applies to the
moral and social implications of these developments.
This article offers a preliminary exploration of this
area. The hypothesis is that scientific and technological
developments in neuroscience and brain-machine
interfacing challenge—and may contribute to shifts
in—some of the culturally determined categories and
classification schemes (our ‘symbolic order’), such as
body, mind, human, machine, free will and responsi-
bility (see the Introduction to this issue: Converging
Technologies, Shifting Boundaries)
Firstly I will examine the expectations regarding
the development of brain-machine interfaces and the
forms of brain-machine interaction that already
actually exist. Subsequently, I will briefly point out
the moral issues raised by these new technologies,
and argue the debate on these issues will be influenced
by the shifts that may take place in our symbolic
order—that is, the popular categories that we use in our
everyday dealings to make sense of our world—as a
result of these developments. It is important to consider
the consequences these technologies might have for our
understanding of central organizing categories, moral
concepts and important values. Section four then
focuses on the categories of human and machine: are
we all going to become cyborgs? Will the distinction
between human and machine blur if more and more
artificialcomponentsare built intothe bodyand brain?I
will argue that the answer depends partly on the context
in which this question is asked, and that the concept of
the person may be more suitable here than that of the
human. Section five is about the distinction between
body and mind. I argue that as a result of our growing
neuroscientific knowledge and the mounting possibili-
ties for technological manipulation, the mind is increas-
ingly seen as a component of the body, and therefore
also more and more in mechanical terms. This put the
concept of moral responsibility under pressure. I will
illustrate the consequences of these shifts in concepts
and in category-boundaries with some examples of the
moral questions confronting us already.
Developments in Brain-Machine Interaction
Various publications and reports on converging
technologies and brain-machine interaction speculate
heatedly on future possibilities for the direct linkage
of the human brain with machines, that is: some form
of computer or ICT technology or other. If the neuro-
sciencesprovide further insight intothe precise working
of the brain, ICT technology becomes increasingly
powerful, the electronics become more refined and the
possibilities for uniting silicones with cells more
advanced, then great things must lie ahead of us—or
so it seems. The popular media, but also serious
governmental reports and even scientific literature,
present scenarios that are suspiciously like science
fiction as realistic prospects: the expansion of memory
orintelligencebymeans ofanimplanted chip; the direct
uploading of encyclopaedias, databases or dictionaries
into the brain; a wireless connection from the brain to
the Internet; thought reading or lie detection via the
analysis of brain activity; direct brain-to-brain com-
munication. A fine example comes from the report
on converging technologies issued by the American
National Science Foundation:
‘Fast, broadband interfaces directly between the
human brain and machines will transform work
in factories, control automobiles, ensure military
superiority, and enable new sports, art forms and
modes of interaction between people. [...] New
communication paradigms (brain-to-brain,
brain-machine-brain, group) could be realized
in 10–20 years.’ [39]
It is not easy to tell which prospects are realistic,
which to a certain extent plausible and which are total
1 See his website www.kurzweilAI.net for these and other
future forecasts
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whilst others contradict them again. These claims
often have utopian characteristics and seem to go
beyond the border between science and science
fiction. Incidentally, they are frequently presented in
such a way as to create goodwill and attract financial
resources. After all, impressive and perhaps, from the
scientific point of view, exaggerated future scenarios
have a political and ideological function too—they
help to secure research funds
2 and to create a certain
image of these developments, either utopian or
dystopian, thus steering public opinion.
Uncertainty about the facts—which expectations
are realistic, which exaggerated and which altogether
impossible—is great, even amongst serious scientists
[12]. Whereas experts in cyberkinetic neurotechnol-
ogy in the reputable medical journal, The Lancet,
are seriously of the opinion that almost naturally-
functioning, brain-driven prostheses will be possible,
the editorial department of the Dutch doctors’ journal,
Medisch Contact, wonders sceptically how many
light-years away they are [1, 23]. It is precisely the
convergence of knowledge and technology from very
different scientific areas that makes predictions so
difficult. Although claims regarding future develop-
ments sometimes seem incredible, actual functioning
forms of brain-machine interaction do in fact exist,
and various applications are at an advanced stage of
development. Next, I will look at what is currently
already possible, or what is actually being researched
and developed.
Existing Brain-Machine Interactions
The first category of existing brain-machine inter-
action is formed by the sensory prostheses. The
earliest form of brain-machine interaction is the
cochlear implant, also known as the bionic ear, which
has been around for about 30 years. This technology
enables deaf people to hear again, by converting
sound into electrical impulses that are transmitted to
an electrode implanted in the inner ear, which
stimulates the auditory nerve directly. While there
have been fierce discussions about the desirability of
the cochlear implant, nowadays they are largely
accepted and are included in the normal arsenal of
medical technology (e.g. [5]). In this same category,
various research lines are currently ongoing to develop
an artificial retina or ‘bionic eye’ to enable blind
people to see again.
A second form of brain-machine interaction is
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS). With this technique
small electrodes are surgically inserted directly into
the brain. These are connected to a subcutaneously
implanted neurostimulator, which sends out tiny
electrical pulses to stimulate a specific brain area.
This technology is used for treatment of neurological
diseases such as Parkinson’s disease and Gilles de la
Tourette’s syndrome. Many new indications are being
studied experimentally, ranging from severe obsessive-
compulsive disorders, addictions, and obesity to Alz-
heimer’s disease and depression. The use of this
technique raises a number of ethical issues, like
informed consent from vulnerable research subjects,
the risks and side-effects, including effects on the
patient’s mood and behaviour [38].
More spectacular, and at an even earlier stage of
development, is the third form of brain-machine
interaction in which the brain controls a computer
directly. This technology, called neuroprosthetics,
enables people to use thought to control objects in
the outside world such as the cursor of a computer or
a robotic arm. It is being developed so that people
with a high spinal cord lesion, like Matt Nagel
mentioned in the introduction, can act and communi-
cate again. An electrode in the brain receives the
electrical impulses that the neurons in the motor
cerebral cortex give off when the patient wants to
make a specific movement. It then sends these
impulses to a computer where they are translated into
instructions to move the cursor or a robot that is
connected to the computer. This technology offers the
prospect that paraplegics or patients with locked in
syndrome could move their own wheelchair with the
aid of thought-control, communicate with others
through written text or voice synthesis, pick up things
with the aid of artificial limbs et cetera.
In future, the direct cortical control described
above could also be used in the further development
of artificial limbs (robotic arms or legs) for people
who have had limbs amputated. It is already possible
to receive the signals from other muscles and control
a robotic arm with them (a myoelectrical prosthesis);
2 A lot of research in the field of brain-machine interaction and
other converging technologies is carried out by DARPA, the
American Ministry of Defence research institute. In 2003, for
example, DARPA subsidized research into brain-machine
interfaces to the tune of 24 million dollars [9, 35].
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connected directly to a prosthesis to enable it to move
as though it is the patient’s own arm is now being
examined. Wireless control by the cortex would be a
great step in prosthetics, further enabling patient
rehabilitation. Next to motor control of the prosthesis,
tactile sensors are being developed and placed in
artificial hands to pass on the feeling to the patient’s
own remaining nerves, thus creating a sense of touch.
It is claimed that this meeting of the (micro)technolog-
ical and (neuro)biological sciences will in the future
lead to a significant reduction in invalidity due to
amputation or even its total elimination [23, 24].
In the fourth form of brain-machine interaction, use
is made of neurofeedback. By detecting brain activity
with the aid of electroencephalography (EEG) equip-
ment, it can be made visible to the person involved.
This principle is used, for instance, in a new method
for preventing epileptic attacks with the aid of Vagal
Nerve Stimulation (VNS). Changes in brainwaves can
be detected and used to predict an oncoming epileptic
attack. This ‘warning system’ can then generate an
automatic reaction from the VNS system which
stimulates the vagal nerve to prevent the attack. In
time, the detection electrodes could be implanted
under the skull, and perhaps the direct electrical
stimulation of the cerebral cortex could be used instead of
the vagal nerve [17]. Another type of feedback system is
being developed by the American army and concerns a
helmet with binoculars that can draw a soldier’s
attention to a danger that his brain has subconsciously
detected enabling him to react faster and more ade-
quately. The idea is that EEG can spot ‘neural
signatures’ for target detection before the conscious
mind becomes aware of a potential threat or target [50].
Finally, yet another technology that is currently
making rapid advances is the so-called exoskeleton.
Although this is not a form of brain-machine interaction
initself,itisatechnologythatwillperhapsbeeminently
suitable for combination with said interaction in the
future. An exoskeleton is an external structure that is
worn around the body, or parts of it, to provide strength
andpowerthatthebodydoesnotintrinsicallypossess.It
is chiefly being developed for applications in the army
and in the health care sector.
3 Theoretically, the move-
ments of exoskeletons could also be controlled directly
by thought if the technology of the aforementioned
‘neuroprostheses’ was to be developed further. If, in
the future, the exoskeleton could also give feedback on
feelings (touch, temperature and suchlike), the possi-
bilities could be expanded still further.
Ethical Issues and Shifts in Our Symbolic Order
The developments described above raise various
ethical questions, for instance about the safety, possible
risks and side effects of new technologies. There are
also speculations as to the moral problems or dangers
that may arise in connection with further advances in
this type of technologies. The European Group on
Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), an
influential European advisory body, warns for the risk
that ICT implants will be used to control and locate
people, or that they could provide third parties with
access to information about the body and mind of those
involved, without their permission EGE [9]. There are
also concerns about about the position of vulnerable
research subjects, patient selection and informed
consent, the effects on personal identity, resource
allocation and about the use of such technologies for
human enhancement Over the past few years, the
neuroethical discussion on such topics has been
booming (e.g. [2, 7, 10, 12, 14, 46, 20]).
It has been argued that while these ethical issues
are real, they do not present anything really new [8].
The point of departure of this article, however, is that
it is not so easy to deal adequately with the moral
questions raised by these new technologies because
they also challenge some of the central concepts and
categories that we use in understanding and answer-
ing moral questions. Hansson, for example, states that
brain implants may be “reason to reconsider our
criteria for personal identity and personality changes”
[20; p. 523]. Moreover, these new technologies may
also change some elements of our common morality
itself, just like the birth control pill once helped to
change sexual morality [28]. In brief: new technolo-
gies not only influence the ways we can act, but also
the symbolic order: our organizing categories and the
associated views on norms and values.
The concepts and categories we, as ordinary people,
use to classify our world to make it manageable and
comprehensible are subject to change. These categories
3 In the former case, these applications might enable soldiers to
carry heavy rucksacks more easily, in the latter they could, for
example, help a nurse to lift a heavy patient on his or her own.
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since they often have a normative next to a descriptive
dimension. Categories such as human and machine,
bodyandmind,sickandhealthy,natureandculture,real
and unreal are difficult to define precisely and the
boundaries of such notions are always vague and
movable. Time and again it takes ‘symbolic labour’ to
reinterpret these categoriesandtore-conceptualisethem
and make them manageable in new situations. In part,
this symbolic labour is being done by philosophers who
explicitly work with concepts and definitions, refining
and adjusting them; in part it is also a diffuse socio-
cultural process of adaptation and emerging changes in
symbolic order.
4 Boundaries are repeatedly negotiated
or won, and new concepts arise where old ones no
longer fit the bill An example is the new concept of
‘brain dead’ which arose a few decades ago as a
consequence of the concurrent developments in elec-
troencephalography, artificial respiration and organ
transplantation. Here the complex interplay of tech-
nology, popular categories of life and death, and
scientific and philosophical understandings of these
concepts is clearly demonstrated [27;p .1 6 ] .
Morality, defined as our more or less shared system
of norms, values and moral judgements, is also subject
to change It is not a static ‘tool’ that we can apply to all
kinds of new technologically induced moral problems.
Technological and social developments influence and
change our morality, although this does not apply
equally to all its elements. Important values such as
justice, well-being or personal autonomy are reasonably
stable, but they are also such abstract notions that they
are open to various and changing interpretations. The
norms we observe in order to protect and promote our
values depend on these interpretations and may require
adjustment under new circumstances. Some norms are
relatively fixed, others more contingent and changing
[6]. The detailed and concrete moral rules of conduct
derived from the general norms are the most contin-
gent and changeable. The introduction of the notion
brain death, for example, led to adaptations in ethical
norms and regulations. Likewise, the new develop-
ments in genomics research are now challenging
and changing existing rules of informed consent as
well as notions of privacy and rules for privacy
protection [33].
In the field of brain-machine interaction we can
therefore also expect that certain fixed categories that
we classify our world with and that structure our
thinking, will evolve alongside the new technologies.
This will have consequences for the ethical questions
these technologies raise and for the way in which we
handle both new and familiar moral issues. A first
shift that can be expected concerns the distinction
between human and machine. This distinction might
fade as more parts of the body can be replaced with
mechanical or artificial parts that become more and
more ‘real’. Secondly, we might expect a blurring of
boundaries between our familiar concepts of body
and mind when neuroscience and neurotechnologies
increasingly present the brain as an ordinary part of
our body and the mind as simply one of its ‘products’.
The following sections analyse these possible shifts in
the symbolic order and the associated moral questions
in more detail.
Symbolic Order in Motion: The Human Machine
The blurring of the boundary between human and
machine brought about by brain-machine interaction
forms the first challenge to the familiar categories
with which we think. The more artificial parts are
inserted in and added to the human body, the more
uncertainty there is about where the human stops and
the machine begins. Instead of human or machine, we
increasingly seem to be looking at cyborgs: human
and machine in a single being.
For a long time it was easy to distinguish between
people and the tools, machines or devices that they
used. Gradually, however, our lives have become
increasingly entangled with machines—or, in the
broader sense, with technology—and we have become
dependent on them for practically every facet of our
daily lives. Increasingly, parts of the human body itself
are replaced or supplemented by technology.
5 Of
4 How these processes interact with one another and how socio-
cultural changes influence philosophical thinking and vice
versa is an interesting and complicated question, that I cannot
start to answer here.
5 Not that this is an entirely new phenomenon, seeing that all
sorts of bodily prostheses have existed for centuries; the first
artificial leg dates back to 300 before Christ. Other prostheses
that we more or less attach to our bodies are, for instance,
spectacles, hairpieces and hearing aids. But the insertion of
external parts into the human body is more recent.
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machine has been a leitmotiv in western culture since
Descartes; this vision has enabled modern medicine
while the successesachievedsubstantiatetheunderlying
beliefs about the body at the same time. The emergence
of transplantation medicine was a clear step in the
development of popular views on the body as a machine.
Since thefirst kidney transplantationin 1954andthe first
heart transplantation in 1967, lungs, liver, pancreas and
even hands and faces have become transplantable, thus
enforcingtheimage of the humanbodyasa collectionof
replaceable parts. Some have criticised transplantation
medicine because of the ensuing mechanization and
commodification of the human body.
Besides organs, more and more artefacts are now
being implanted in the human body: artificial heart
valves, pacemakers, knees, arterial stents and subcutane-
ous medicine pumps. Prostheses that are attached to the
body, such as artificial limbs, are becoming increasingly
advanced, and are no longer easy to detach—unlike
theold-fashionedwoodenleg.Experiencesofpatients
who wear prostheses seem to indicate that people
rapidly adapt to using them and fuse with them to the
extent that they perceive them as natural parts of
themselves. Artificial parts are rapidly included in the
body scheme and come to be felt as ‘ones own’.
6
In a certain sense, then, we are familiar with the
perception of the body as a sort of machine, and with
the fact that fusing the human body with artificial
parts is possible. Do technologies like neuroprostheses,
artificial limbs and exoskeletons break through the
boundary between human and machine in a fundamen-
tally new, different fashion? Should the conceptual
distinction between human and machine perhaps be
revised? Many publications, both popular and more
academic, suggest that the answer has to be yes. A
notion that is often used in this connection is that of the
cyborg: the human machine.
Cyborgs
The term ‘cyborg’—derived from cybernetic organism—
was coined in 1960 by Manfred Clynes and Nathan
Kline, American researchers who wrote about the
ways in which the vulnerable human body could be
technologically modified to meet the requirements of
space travel and exploration. The figure of the cyborg
appealed to the imagination and was introduced into
popularculturebysciencefictionwriters,filmmakers,
cartoonists and game designers; famous cyborgs
include The Six Million Dollar Man, Darth Vader
and RoboCop. In the popular image, the cyborg thus
stands for the merging of the human and the machine.
In recent literature, both popular and scientific, the
cyborg has come to stand for all sorts of man-machine
combinations and all manner of technological and
biotechnological enhancements or modifications of
the human body. With the publication of books like
I, Cyborg or Cyborg Citizen, the concept now covers
a whole area of biopolitical questions. Everything that
is controversial around biotechnological interven-
tions, that raises moral questions and controversy,
that evokes simultaneous horror and admiration, is now
clustered under the designation ‘cyborg’ [18, 25, 48].
The concept of the cyborg indicates that something
is the matter, that boundaries are transgressed,
familiar categorizations challenged, creating unease
and uncertainty. For Donna Haraway, well-known for
her Cyborg Manifesto [21], the concept of the cyborg
stands for all the breaches of boundaries and
disruptions of order, not merely for the specific
breaking through of the distinction between human
and machine which concerns me here. The term cyborg
can thus be used to describe our inability to categorize
some new forms of human life or human bodies. The
use of the term compels us to delay categorization—in
familiar terms of human or machine—at least for the
moment and so creates a space for further exploration.
Monsters
Following Mary Douglas, Martijntje Smits has called
these kind of entities that defy categorization and
challenge the familiar symbolic order monsters [44].
Smits discusses four strategies for treating these
6 More attention has recently been paid to the importance of the
body for the development and working of our consciousness. In
the Embodied Mind model, body and mind are seen far more as
interwoven than in the past (e.g. [15]). This can have even further
implications for brain-machine interaction; if for example,
neuroprostheses change our physical, bodily dealings with the
world, this may also have consequences for the development of
the brain and for our consciousness. Neuroscientists have even
claimed that: ‘It may sound like science fiction but if human
brain regions involved in bodily self-consciousness were to be
monitored and manipulated online via a machine, then not only
will the boundary between user and robot become unclear, but
human identity may change, as such bodily signals are crucial for
the self and the ‘I’ of conscious experience’ [4]
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new entities and the disruption they bring about.
The first strategy, embracing the monster, is clearly
reflected in the pronouncements of adherents of the
transhumanist movement. They welcome all manner
of biotechnological enhancements of humans, believe
in the exponential development of the possibilities to
this end and place the cyborg, almost literally, on a
pedestal. The second strategy is the opposite of the
first and entails exorcizing the monster. Neo-Luddites
or bioconservatives see biotechnology in general and
the biotechnological enhancement of people in particu-
lar, as a threat to the existing natural order. They
frequently refer to human nature, traditional categories
and values and norms when attacking and trying to curb
the new possibilities. To them, the cyborg is a real
monster that has to be stopped and exorcized.
The third strategy is that of adaptation of the
monster. Endeavours are made to classify the new
phenomenon in terms of existing categories after all.
Adaptation seems to be what is happening with regard
to existing brain-machine interaction. The conceptual
framework here is largely formed by the familiar
medical context of prostheses and aids. The designa-
tion of the electrodes and chips implanted in the brain
as neuroprostheses, places them in the ethical area of
therapy, medical treatment, the healing of the sick and
support of the handicapped. As long as something
that was naturally present but is now lost due to
sickness or an accident is being replaced, brain-
machine interaction can be understood as therapy
and therefore accepted within the ethical limits
normally assigned to medical treatments. However,
for non-medical applications the problem of classi-
fications remains. Prostheses to replace functions that
have been lost may be accepted relatively easily, but
how are we going to regard enhancements or
qualitative changes in functions such as the addition
of infrared vision to the human visual faculty? Are we
only going to allow the creation of cyborgs for
medical purposes, or also for military goals, or for
relaxation and entertainment?
Finally, the fourth strategy is assimilation of the
monster, whereby existing categories and concepts are
adjusted or new ones introduced.
7 In the following I
will suggest that the concept of the person—in the
sense in which it is used in ethics, rather than in
common language—may be useful for this purpose.
Morality of Persons
In the empirical sense, cyborgs, or blends of human
bodies with mechanical parts, are gradually becoming
less exceptional. It therefore seems exaggerated to
view people with prostheses or implants as something
very exceptional or to designate them as a separate
class. And this raises the question of why we should
really worry about the blurring of the distinction
between human and machine? This is not merely
because the mixing of the flesh with steel or silicone
intuitively bothers us, or because the confusion about
categories scares us. More fundamentally, I believe
this is because the distinction between the human and
the machine also points to a significant moral
distinction. The difference between the two concepts
is important because it indicates a moral dividing line
between two different normative categories. For most
of our practices and everyday dealings the normative
distinction between human and machine matters. You
just treat people differently to machines—with more
respect and care—and you expect something else
from people than you expect from machines—
responsibility and understanding, for example. Human
beings deserve praise and blame for their actions while
machines cannot. The important question is therefore
whether brain-machine interfaces will somehow affect
the moral status of the people using them [13]. Do we
still regard a paralysed patient with a brain implant and
an exoskeleton as a human being, or do we see him as
a machine? Will we consider someone with two bionic
legs to be a human being or a machine?
I belief that in part this also depends on the context
and the reasons for wanting to make the distinction.
In the context of athletic competition, the bionic
runner may be disqualified because of his supra-human
capacities. Inthiscontext,heis‘too muchofa machine’
to grant fair competition with fully biological human
beings. However, in the context of everyday interaction
with others, a person with bionic legs is just as morally
responsible for his actions as any other person. In this
sense he clearly is human and not a machine. This is
because,withregardtomoralstatus,thehumanbeingas
an acting, responsible moral agent is identified more
with the mind than with the body. The mind is what
7 The distinction between adaptation and assimilation is not
very clear—it depends on what one would wish to call an
‘adaptation’ or ‘adjustment’ of a concept.
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wheelchair with the aid of hands, or electrical brain-
generated pulses, is irrelevant to the question of who
controls the wheelchair: the answer in both cases is the
person concerned. Whether someone is paralysed or not
does not alter the question of whether he or she is a
person or not; it will of course affect the kind of person
heorshe isbutwhether heorshe isapersondepends on
his or her mental capacities. Ethical theories consider
the possession of some minimal set of cognitive,
conative and affective capacities as a condition for
personhood. This means that, ethically speaking, under
certain conditions, intelligent primates or Martians
could be considered persons while human babies or
extremely demented old people would not. Whatever
the exact criteria one applies, there is no reason to doubt
the fact that someone who is paralysed, someone who
controls a robot by remote or someone who has a DBS
electrode is a person. Certain moral entitlements,
obligations and responsibilities are connected to that
state of ‘being a person’. This notion therefore helps to
resolve the confusion surrounding the cyborg. Rather
than classifying him as either man or machine, we
should be looking at personhood. Personhood is what
really matters morally and this is not necessarily
affected by brain-machine interfaces. As long as they
do not affect personhood, brain-machine interfaces are
no more special than other types of prosthesis, implants
orinstrumentalaidsthatwehavealreadygrownusedto.
New Views on Physical Integrity?
Nevertheless, brain-machine interfaces may in some
cases cause new moral issues. A concrete example
that can illustrate how shifting catagories can affect
concepts and ethics is that of physical integrity. How
should this important ethical and legal principle be
interpreted when applied to cyborgs? The principle
itself is not under discussion. We want to continue to
guard and protect physical integrity. The question is,
however, how to define the concept ‘body’ now that
biological human bodies are becoming increasingly
fused with technology and where to draw the line
between those plastic, metal or silicone parts that do
belong to that body and the parts that do not.
In the spring of 2007 the Dutch media paid
attention to an asylum seeker who had lost an arm
as a result of torture in his native country and
had received a new myoelectrical prosthesis in the
Netherlands. He just got used to the arm and was
trained in using it naturally when it became apparent
that there were problems with the insurance and he
would have to return the prosthesis. Evidently,
according to the regulations a prosthesis does not
belong to the body of the person in question and it
does not enjoy the protection of physical integrity.
However, the loss of an arm causes a great deal of
damage to the person, whether the arm is natural or a
well-functioning prosthesis. If prostheses become
more intimately connected to and integrated with the
body (also through tactile sensors) such that they
become incorporated in the body scheme and are
deemed a natural part of the body by the person
concerned, it seems there must come a point at which
such a prosthesis should be seen as belonging to the
(body of the) person concerned from the moral and
legal point of view. It has even been questioned
whether the interception of signals that are transmitted
by a wireless link from the brain to a computer or
artificial limb, should perhaps also fall under the
protection of physical integrity [29]
Symbolic Order in Motion: Body-Mind
In the previous section I assumed the distinction
between body and mind to be clear-cut. The common
view is that the mind controls the body (whether this
body is natural or artificial) and that the mind is the
seat of our personhood, and of consciousness,
freedom and responsibility. In this section I examine
how this view might change under the influence of
new brain-machine interactions and neuroscientific
developments in general and what implications this
may have for ethics. I will concentrate on DBS, since
this brain-machine technique has at present the
clearest impact on human mind and behaviour.
8 Of
course,however,our categoriesandcommonviewswill
not change because of one single new technique—
rather, it is the whole constellation of neuroscientific
research and (emerging) applications that may change
the ways in which we understand our minds and
important related concepts.
8 By contrast, in the case of the neuroprosthesis discussed in the
previous section, it is mainly the mind that influences the body,
through the interface.
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Neuroprostheses and other brain-machine interactions
call into question the demarcation between body and
mind, at least in the popular perception. Technologies
such as neuroprosthetics and DBS make very clear the
fact that physical intervention in the brain has a direct
effect on the mind of the person in question. By
switching the DBS electrode on or off, the behaviour,
feelings and thoughts of the patient can be changed
instantly. Thoughts of a paralysed person can be
translated directly into electrical pulses and physical
processes. As a result of neuroscience and its
applications the human mind comes to be seen more
and more as a collection of neurones, a system of
synapses, neurotransmitters and electrical conductors.
A very complex system perhaps, but a physical
system nonetheless, that can be connected directly to
other systems.
For some, this causes moral concern, since it may
lead us to see ourselves merely in mechanical terms:
‘The obvious temptation will be to see advances in
neuroelectronics as final evidence that man is just a
complex machine after all, that the brain is just a
computer, that our thoughts and identity are just
software. But in reality, our new powers should lead
us to a different conclusion: even though we can
make the brain compatible with machines to serve
specific functions, the thinking being is a being of
very different sorts.’ [26;p .4 0 –41]
I believe this change in our popular view of the
mind that Keiper fears is actually already taking
place. Neuroscientific knowledge and understanding
penetrate increasingly into our everyday lives, and it
is becoming more normal to understand our behaviour
and ourselves in neurobiological terms. This shift
is for example noticeable in the rise of biological
psychiatry. Many psychiatric syndromes that were still
understood in psychoanalytical or psychodynamic
terms until well into the second half of the twentieth
century, are now deemed biological brain diseases. The
shift is also noticeable in the discussion on the
biological determinants of criminal behaviour (and
opportunities to change such behaviour by intervening
in the brain) or in the increased attention for the
biological and evolutionary roots of morality. Also in
popular magazines and books, our behaviour and
ourselves are increasingly presented as the direct result
of our brains’ anatomy and physiology.
Scientific and technological developments have
contributed to this shift. The development of EEG in
the first half of the last century revealed the electrical
activity of the brain for the first time, thus creating the
vision of the brain as the wiring of the mind. The
development of psychiatric drugs in the second half
of the last century also helped naturalize our vision
of the mind, picturing the brain as a neurochemical
‘soup’, a collection of synapses, neurotransmitters and
receptors [22]. More recently the PET scan and the
fMRI have made it possible to look, as it were, inside
the active brain. The fact that fMRI produces such
wonderful pictures of brains ‘in action’ contributes to
our mechanical view of the relation between brain and
behaviour. Certain areas of the brain light up if we
make plans, others if an emotional memory is evoked;
damage in one area explains why the psychopath has
no empathy, a lesion in another correlates with poor
impulse control or hot-headedness. While neurophilo-
sophers have warned against the oversimplified idea
that images are just like photographs that show us
directly how the brain works, these beautiful, colourful
images appeal to scientists and laymen alike [41].
According to Nikolas Rose, we have come to
understand ourselves increasingly in terms of a
biomedical body, and our personalities and behaviour
increasingly in terms of the brain. He says that a new
way of thinking has taken shape: ‘In this way of
thinking, all explanations of mental pathology must
‘pass through’ the brain and its neurochemistry—
neurones,synapses,membranes,receptors,ionchannels,
neurotransmitters, enzymes, etc.’ [40;p .5 7 ]
We are experiencing what he calls a ‘neurochemical
reshaping of personhood’ [40; p. 59]. Likewise, Mooij
has argued that the naturalistic determinism of the
neurosciences is also catching on in philosophy and
has now spread broadly in the current culture ‘that
is to a large extent steeped in this biological thinking,
in which brain and person more or less correspond’
[34;p . 7 7 ] .
The mind is being seen more and more as a
physical, bodily object (the ‘the mind = the brain’
idea), and given that the human body, as described
above, has long been understood in mechanical terms,
the equal status of the mind and brain means that the
mind can also be understood in mechanical terms. As
the basic distinction between mind and machine
seems to drop away the distinction between human
and machine once more raises its head, but now on
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morally speaking. If in fact our mind, the seat of our
humanity, is also a machine, how should we under-
stand personhood in the morally relevant sense? How
can we hold on to notions such as free will and moral
responsibility?
Neuroscientific Revisionism
A recent notion amongst many neuroscientists and
some neurophilosophers is that our experience of
having a self, a free will or agency, is based on a
misconception. The self as a regulating, controlling
authority does not exist, but is only an illusion
produced by the brain.
9 From this notion it seems to
follow that there is no such thing as free will and that
there can therefore be no real moral responsibility.
Within philosophy revisionists, who claim that our
retributive intuitions and practices are unwarranted
under determinism, claim that this view obliges us to
revise our responsibility-attributing practices, includ-
ing our legal system. Revisionism implies the need to
replace some of our ordinary concepts with new ones.
It has, for example, been suggested to substitute
blame with ‘dispraise’ [43] or to eliminate concepts
connected to desert like blame, moral praise, guilt and
remorse, altogether [47]. On a revisionist account,
praise, blame and punishment are just devices that
modify conduct, and that can be more or less
effective, but not more or less deserved.
Greene and Cohen assume that because of the
visible advances in the neurosciences—and I take
brain-machine interfaces to be part of those—the
naturalistic deterministic view on human behaviour will
by degrees be accepted by more and more people, and
revisionism will catch on [19]. To their way of
thinking, our moral intuitions and our folk psychology
will slowly adapt to the overwhelming evidence the
neurosciences present us with. The technologies
enabled on the basis of neuroscientific understanding,
such as DBS, neurofeedback, psychiatric drugs, and
perhaps also intelligent systems or intelligent robots,
can contribute to this. Little by little we will hold
people less responsible and liable for their actions,
according to Greene and Cohen, but will see them
increasingly as determined beings who can be
regulated, more or less effectively, by sanctions or
rewards. They allege that questions concerning free will
and responsibility will lose their power in an age in
which the mechanistic nature of the human decision
process will be totally understood. This will also have
consequences for the legal system. ‘The law will con-
tinue topunishmisdeeds,asitmust forpractical reasons,
but the idea of distinguishing the truly, deeply guilty
from those who are merely victims of neuronal circum-
stances will, we submit, seem pointless.’ ([19; p. 1781])
Greene and Cohen, like other revisionists, advocate
a shift in the nature of our criminal justice system,
from a retributive to a consequentialistic system. This
means a shift from a system based on liability and
retribution to one based on effects and effectiveness
of punishment. A consequentialistic system of this
kind is, in their opinion, in keeping with the true
scientific vision of hard determinism and the non-
existence of free will. Greene and Cohen recognize
that many people will intuitively continue to think in
terms of free will and responsibility. What is more,
they think that this intuitive reflex has arisen through
evolution and is deeply rooted in our brains. We can
hardly help thinking in these sorts of terms, despite
the fact that we know better, scientifically speaking.
Nonetheless, Greene and Cohen insist that we should
base important, complex matters such as the criminal
justice system
10 on the scientific truth about ourselves
and not allow ourselves to be controlled by persistent,
but incorrect, intuitions.
9 ‘Obviouslywehavethoughts.Adnauseam,onemightsay.What
is deceptive, is the idea that these thoughts control our behaviour.
In my opinion, that idea is no more than a side effect of our social
behaviour. […] The idea that we control our deeds with our
thoughts, that is an illusion’, says cognitive neuroscientist Victor
Lamme, echoing his collegue Wegner. [30;p .2 2 ,49].
10 Likewise, moral views on responsibility may change. An
instrumental, neo-behaviouristic vision on morality and the
moral practice of holding one another responsible might arise.
Holding one another responsible may still prove a very
effective way of regulating behaviour, even if it is not based
on the actual existence of responsibility and free will. As long
people change their behaviour under the influence of moral
praise and blame, there is no reason to throw the concept of
responsibility overboard. From this point of view, there would
be no relevant difference anymore between a human being and
any other system that would be sensitive to praise and blame,
such as an intelligent robot or computer system. If such a
system would be sensitive to moral judgements and respond to
them with the desired behaviour on this view they would
qualify as much as moral actors as human beings would.
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A whole body of literature has accumulated refuting
this thesis and arguing that new neuroscientific
evidence need not influence our moral and legal
notions of responsibility (e.g. [37]). This literature
reflects the dominant position in the determinism
debate nowadays, that of compatibilism. According to
compatibilism determinism is reconcilable with the
existence of a free will, and with responsibility. As
long as we can act on the basis of reasons and as long
as we are not coerced, we are sufficiently free to carry
responsibility and the naturalistic neuroscientific
explanatory model of behaviour is therefore not
necessarily a threat to our free will and responsibility,
accordingtothecompatibilist.Thequestionis,however,
whetherthe compatibilist’sphilosophicalargumentation
also convinces the average layman or neuroscientist,
certainly in the light of new experimental findings and
technical possibilities. How popular views on this topic
will develop remains to be seen.
At the moment even adherents of the revisionist
view seem convinced that we will never be able to
stop thinking, or even think less, in terms of intentions,
reasons, free will and responsibility. It seems almost
inconceivable not to hold one another responsible for
deeds and behaviour [45].
Nevertheless, neuroscientific research does chal-
lenge our view of ourselves as rational, autonomous
and moral beings [31]. Research shows us, for
example, that many if not most of our actions
automatic, unconsciously initiated and only some of
our actions are deliberate and consciously based
on reasons. Our rationality, moreover, is limited by
various biases, like confirmation bias, hyperbolic
discounting, false memories et cetera. New findings
in neuroscience, such as the fact that immaturity of
the frontal lobes impedes the capacities for reasoning,
decision making and impulse control in adolescents,
or that exercise of self-constraint eventually leads
to exhaustion of the capacity for self-control (ego-
depletion), do necessitate us to re-think the ways in
which or the degrees to which we are actually morally
responsible is specific situations and circumstances
(see for example the series of articles on addiction and
responsibility in AJOB Neuroscience 2007).
A more naturalized view of the human mind could
thus still have important consequences, even if we
do not jettison the notion of moral responsibility
altogether. More grounds for ‘absence of criminal
responsibility’ could, for example, be acknowledged
in criminal law, whereby new technologies could play
a role. Functional brain scans might provide more
clarity on the degree to which an individual has
control over his or her own behaviour.
Prosthetic Responsibility?
Due to their ability to directly influence complex
human behaviour by intervening in the brain, brain-
machine interfaces may raise interesting issues of
responsibility, even when we reject revisionism, as
can be illustrated by the following case of a 62 year
old Parkinson patient treated with DBS.
11
After implantation of the electrodes, this patient
became euphoric and demonstrated unrestrained
behaviour: he bought several houses that he could
not really pay for; he bought various cars and got
involved in traffic accidents; he started a relationship
with a married woman and showed unacceptable and
deviant sexual behaviour towards nurses; he suffered
from megalomania and, furthermore, did not under-
stand his illness at all. He was totally unaware of any
problem. Attempts to improve his condition by chang-
ing the settings of the DBS failed as the manic
characteristics disappeared but the patient’s severe
Parkinson’s symptoms reappeared. The patient was
either in a reasonable motor state but in a manic
condition lacking any self reflection and understanding
ofhisillness,orbedriddeninanon-deviantmentalstate.
The mania could not be treated by medication [32].
Who was responsible for the uninhibited behaviour
of the patient in this case? Was that still the patient
himself, was it the stimulator or the neurosurgeon
who implanted and adjusted the device? In a sense,
the patient was ‘not himself’ during the stimulation;
he behaved in a way that he never would have done
without the stimulator.
12 That behaviour was neither
11 This case also been discussed by [3, 16, 42].
12 Of course, this problem is not exclusive for DBS; some
medications can have similar effects. However, with DBS the
changes are more rapid and more specific and can be controlled
literally by a remote control (theoretically, the patients behaviour
can thus be influenced without the patient’s approval once the
electrode is in his brain). These characteristics do make DBS
different from more traditional means of behaviour influencing,
though I agree with an anonymous reviewer that this is more a
matter of degree than an absolute qualitative difference.
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and it therefore looks as though no one can be held
morally responsible for it. However, in his non-manic
state when, according to his doctors, he was compe-
tent to express his will and had a good grasp of the
situation, the patient chose to have the stimulator
switched on again. After lengthy deliberations the
doctors complied with his wishes. To what extent
were his doctors also responsible for his manic
behaviour? After all, they knew the consequences of
switching on the stimulator again. To what extent was
the patient himself subsequently to blame for getting
into debt and bothering nurses?
For such decisions, the notion of ‘diachronic
responsibility’ [36] can be of use, indicating that a
person can take responsibility for his future behaviour
by taking certain actions. Suppose, for example, that
DBS would prove an effective treatment for addic-
tion, helping people to stay off drugs, alcohol or
gambling, could it then rightly be considered a
‘prosthesis for willpower’ [11], or even a prosthesis
for responsibility? I believe that technologies that
enable us to control our own behaviour better—as
DBS might do in the case of addiction, or in the
treatment of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder—can be
understood in terms of diachronic responsibility and
self-control, and thus enhance autonomy and respon-
sibility [42].
Future applications of brain-machine interaction
may raise further questions: suppose a doctor would
adjust the settings of DBS without consent from the
patient and cause behaviour the patient claimed not to
identify with—who would then be responsible? As
Clausen has pointed out, neuroprostheses may chal-
lenge our traditional concept of responsibility when
imperfections in the system lead to involuntary actions
of the patient [7]. Likewise, if the wireless signals of a
neuroprosthesis were incidentally or deliberately dis-
rupted, it would be questionable who would be
responsible for the ensuing ‘actions’ of the patient.
Clearly, even without major shifts in our views on
free will and responsibility, brain-machine interfaces
will require us to consider questions of responsibility.
Conclusion
The convergence of neuroscientific knowledge with
bio-, nano-, and information technology is already
beginning to be fruitful in the field of brain-machine
interaction, with applications like DBS, neuropros-
thesis and neurofeedback. It is hard to predict the
specific applications awaiting us in the future,
although there is no shortage of wild speculations.
The emergence of new technical possibilities also
gives rise to shifts in our popular understanding of
basic categories, and to some new moral issues. The
boundaries of the human body are blurring and must
be laid down anew; our views on what it is to be a
person, to have a free will and to have responsibility
are once more up for discussion. In this article I have
explored how these shifts in categories and concepts
might work out.
I have argued that the distinction between human
and machine, insofar as it concerns a morally relevant
distinction, does not have to be given up immediately
because increasingly far-reaching physical combina-
tions are now being made between human and
mechanical parts. Depending on the context and the
reasons we have for wanting to make a distinction, we
will draw the line between human and machine
differently. In the context of sports, a bionic limb
may disqualify its user for being too much of a
‘machine’ while in another context such a limb may
be qualified as an integral part of a human being and
be protected under the right to physical integrity.
Important general moral questions that lie behind the
confusion about categories of human and machine
concern moral responsibility and moral status. The
conceptofaperson,asusedinethicaltheorytodesignate
moral actors, is more precise and more useful in this
context than the general category of the ‘human’ or the
poly-interpretable notion of the ‘cyborg’.
In the most radical scenario of shifts in our
symbolic order, the concept of ‘person’ may also
come under pressure. As I have shown based on
Greene and Cohen's vision, the person as a being with
a free will and moral responsibility, and as a moral
actor, should, according to some, disappear from the
stage altogether. Implementing such a neuroreduc-
tionistic vision on the mind and free will would have
clear consequences for criminal law: it would have
to be revised to a consequentialist, neo-behaviouristic
system. People would then barely be considered to be
morally responsible beings but be seen as systems that
respond to praise and blame in a mechanical fashion. I
believe it is unlikely that such a shift in our popular
views will come about, because the intuitive appeal of
228 Nanoethics (2009) 3:217–230the notion of responsibility, and because there are
many good arguments to resist this shift. Even if we
do not jettison responsibility altogether, however,
brain-machine interactions raise many interesting
questions regarding distribution and attribution of
responsibility.
A general lesson for ethics of emerging technologies
is that such technologies necessitate renewed consider-
ation and reinterpretation of important organizing
concepts and distinctions that are crucial to moral
judgement. The symbolic labour required to answer
such conceptual and normative questions is at least as
important for the development of converging technol-
ogies as the technical-scientific labour involved.
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